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Does Congress Have the Power to Make the States
Amenable to Suit inFederal Court for Claims
Under the Lanham Act?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 423-426. © 1999 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
Sehool, Milwaukee, Wis.;
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377. Prof. Grenig is the
co-author of West's Handbook
of Federal Civil Discovery
and Disclosure.

Editor'sNote: Because the respondents' briefs were not available
before Preview's deadline, this article was based on the petitioner's
brief and lower court opinions.

ISSUE
Does the Eleventh Amendment bar
bringing suit in federal court against
a state for false advertising in violation of the Lanham Trade-Mark
Act?
FACTS
Since 1987, College Savings Bank
has sold a certificate of deposit
known as the CollegeSure CD. The
purpose of the CollegeSure CD is to
help individuals save money for college expenses. College Savings guarantees returns sufficient to fund the
uncertain future cost of education.
The CollegeSure CD is administered
using a patented methodology.
Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board administers a similar
investment program intended to
provide sufficient funds to cover

future college expenses. In conjunction with the sale of its accounts,
Florida Prepaid published brochures
and issued annual reports.
College Savings first brought action
in federal district court against
Florida Prepaid in 1994 alleging that
Florida Prepaid had infringed its
patent. The Supreme Court agreed
to hear Florida Prepaid's appeal in
that case. FloridaPrepaid
PostsecondaryEducation Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,
Docket No. 98-531 (see the article
in this issue of Preview).
College Savings later brought a second action in the same federal district court in 1995 against Florida
Prepaid, this time alleging that it
had violated Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)). College Savings claimed
that Florida Prepaid made misstate-
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ments about Florida Prepaid's
tuition savings plans in its
brochures and annual reports constituting unfair competition. College
Savings relied on the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act of 1992
(TRCA), which purports to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the Lanham Act.
Florida Prepaid filed motions to dismiss College Savings' complaint. It
argued that the court did not have
jurisdiction over the case because
Florida Prepaid, as an arm of the
state of Florida, was protected from
suit in federal court by the Eleventh
Amendment. The United States
thereafter intervened to defend the
constitutionality of the Lanham
Act's application to the states.
The district court found that the
TRCA was an unconstitutional
attempt to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity and
dismissed College Savings' suit. The
court concluded that inasmuch as
the case did not involve a protected
property interest, the enactment of
the TRCA was not a proper exercise
of Congress' powers under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
also found that Florida Prepaid had
not waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
College Savings appealed the dismissal. Affirming the district court,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit also held that the
TRCA exceeded the scope of
Congress' authority and that Florida
Prepaid had not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 131 F.3d
353 (3d Cir. 1997). The Supreme
Court of the United States agreed to
review the Third Circuit's decision.
119 S.Ct. 79 (1999).

CASE ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Amendment provides
that the "Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Determining whether
Congress has abrogated the states'
constitutionally secured immunity
from suit in federal court is a twostep inquiry: (1) determining
whether Congress has unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate
immunity, and (2) examining
whether in purporting to abrogate
immunity, Congress has overstepped its constitutional authority.
Supreme Court decisions have
established that Eleventh
Amendment immunity is not
absolute. See Kevin Worthen,
"Federalism: State Immunity from
Tribal Suits Enforcing the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act: Indian
Rights in the New Era of
Federalism," Preview of United
States Supreme Court Cases 19
(1995).
The Supreme Court has held that at
least some constitutional provisions
grant Congress the authority to subject states to suit in federal court so
long as Congress makes its intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity
unmistakably clear. See Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234 (1985).
In Seminole Tribe of Floridav.
Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996), the
Supreme Court held that Congress
could not abrogate the sovereign
immunity of the states when acting
pursuant to its plenary power to
regulate commerce under Article I
of the Constitution. The Court said
that by ratifying the Fourteenth
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Amendment, the states agreed to
waive their Eleventh Amendment
immunity only with respect to the
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In recognizing states'
broad Eleventh Amendment immunity from the authority of the federal judiciary, the Court left open the
question of what recourse would be
available to a patent or copyright
holder if a state misappropriates a
patent or copyright.
Since Seminole Tribe, the only legislative tool the Supreme Court has
recognized for abrogating the sovereign immunity of the states is
Congress' power to enforce the
substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment is a
clear limitation on the authority of
the states and fundamentally altered
the balance of state and federal
power struck by the Constitution.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits any state
from making or enforcing any law
abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,
depriving any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of
law, or denying the equal protection
of the laws. Section 5 of the
Amendment grants Congress the
power to enforce the prohibitions
of Section 1 by "appropriate
legislation."
Meanwhile, one of the main purposes of the Lanham Act is to protect
persons engaged in interstate commerce from unfair competition
caused by false or misleading representations or advertising about
goods, services, or commercial
activities. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
Congress amended the Lanham Act
in 1992 when it enacted the TRCA
to clarify its intent to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of
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states in actions under the Lanham
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Congress enacted the TRCA in
response to the Supreme Court's
decisions requiring explicit and
unambiguous statutory language to
manifest Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.
The Third Circuit reasoned that
Seminole Tribe's limitations on the
scope of Congress' powers to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity render the TRCA unconstitutional. According to the Third
Circuit, in order for a law to be a
valid mechanism to enforce the due
process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it must not create new
substantive rights but instead must
provide a method of protecting
against violations of rights that are
already extant.
Legislation enacted pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment that deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall
within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power even if in the
process it prohibits conduct that is
not itself unconstitutional and
intrudes into "legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to
the States." City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997). Even though
the violations against which a federal law protects do not have to rise to
the level of constitutional violations,
the federal law must further the
goals of protecting property from
state action undertaken without due
process of law.
Contending that the TRCA protects
intangible property rights, College
Savings argues that the TRCA
should be seen as protecting "property" as defined under the
Fourteenth Amendment. According
to College Savings, the TRCA neces-

sarily involves a protected property
right in that it attempts to protect
businesses from harm. On the other
hand, the Third Circuit reasoned
that improper interference with
business prospects does not involve
a property right protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
College Savings also contends that
Florida Prepaid has constructively
waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity on two different grounds:
the Parden doctrine and the
conduct of Florida Prepaid in this
litigation.
Under the Pardendoctrine, a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity can
be constructively waived if (1)
Congress enacts a law providing
that a state will be deemed to have
waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity if it engages in the activity covered by the federal legislation;
(2) the law does so through a clear
statement that gives notice to the
states; (3) a state then engages in
that activity covered by the federal
legislation; and (4) the activity in
question is not an important or core
government function.
The Third Circuit found that the
activity in question does involve an
important or core government function because it is related to education. However, College Savings
argues that Florida Prepaid does not
provide education directly; instead
it provides a means through which
individuals can save for the costs of
I college tuition with an investment
program. According to College
Savings, Florida Prepaid is engaging
in a commercial enterprise and
advertising its products in interstate
commerce.
College Savings also contends that
Florida Prepaid has waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity by

appearing in this litigation, by filing
a counterclaim, and by failing initially to raise the Eleventh
Amendment immunity defense.
According to the Third Circuit,
however, sovereign immunity is an
issue that may be raised at any
time during the pendency of a case.
According to the Third Circuit,
appearing and offering defenses on
the merits of a case does not automatically waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The circuit
court also noted that the reason
Florida Prepaid delayed raising an
Eleventh Amendment defense was
that the constitutionality of the
TRCA was not in question before
the Supreme Court's 1996 decision
in Seminole Tribe.
Although it asserts that Florida
Prepaid did waive its sovereign
immunity by engaging in a commercial activity and by advertising in
interstate commerce after the
enactment of the TRCA, the United
States agrees with the Third Circuit
that a state commercial entity that
engages in false and misleading
advertising of its own product does
not thereby "deprive a competitor
of 'property' within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
SIGNIFICANCE
In this case and its companion case
(FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary
EducationExpense Bd. v. College
Savings Bank, Docket No. 98-531)
along with a third case, Alden v.
Maine, No. 98-436, Preview 358
(1999), the Supreme Court will be
considering the constitutional lines
between Congress' lawmaking
power and states' rights and duties.
These cases require the justices to
confront how best to preserve the
constitutional guarantees of dual
sovereignty.
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The Supreme Court thus has the
opportunity to clarify or limit its
recent decisions in Seminole Tribe
and City of Boerne and thereby
delineate the extent of Congress'
power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity as protected by
the Eleventh Amendment.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For College Savings Bank (David C.
Todd (202) 457-6000)
For the United States (Seth P.
Waxman, Solicitor General, U.S.
Department of Justice (202) 5142217)
For Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board (William
B. Mallin (412) 566-6000)

AMIcus BRIEFS
In Support of College Savings Bank
International Trademark
Association (Martin H. Redish (312)
503-8545)
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